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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GREGORY D. LINEBERRY, : Case No. 20080461-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2008). The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Appellant 
Gregory Lineberry for possession of a prohibited item in a correctional facility, a second 
degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4)(c) (Supp. 2006). The 
judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected Lineberry's request 
for a reduction in the sentence and conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) 
(Supp. 2008). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's refusal to reduce a conviction is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, If 31, 25 P.3d 985. 
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PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal at 154. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is relevant to the issue and set forth at Addendum B: Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
In February 2007, the State filed an information against Lineberry for possession 
of a prohibited item in a correctional facility, a second degree felony offense. (R. 1-2). 
On April 12, 2007, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound Lineberry 
over for trial. (R. 19-20). On April 24, 2008, the court presided over the trial, and at the 
conclusion, the jury found Lineberry guilty. (See R. 115-17; 113 (verdict)). On May 15, 
2008, the trial court entered judgment against Lineberry and sentenced him to a prison 
term of one to fifteen years, to run consecutively to the term he currently was serving. 
(R. 119; 121-23). On May 16, Lineberry filed a notice of appeal. (R. 124). 
The appeal is timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 (2008). Lineberry is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 21, 2006, Glenn Hunter, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, told 
Lieutenant Gordon that his cellmate, Lineberry, had a handcuff key in a pair of 
sweatpants. (R. 153: 16-18). Gordon questioned Lineberry, searched his pants and 
discovered a key in the drawstring of the waistband. (R. 153:20, 23, 26, 69, 73). 
Lineberry told Gordon that he "didn't know where it [came] from." (R. 153:24). 
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As a disciplinary measure, Gordon had Lineberry transferred from Uintah 4 to 
Uintah 1, which is the most secure facility at the prison. (See R. 153:25, 36, 46). Gordon 
also had Hunter transferred to a less restrictive unit - Uintah 3 - at Hunter's request. (R. 
153:35). Officers ultimately returned Hunter to Uintah 4. (SeeR. 153:36-37). 
Lineberry maintained throughout the trial that he borrowed the sweatpants without 
any loiowledge of the key. He testified that on December 21, he saw sweatpants hanging 
on a rail so he hollered out and asked if he could borrow thep. He "got an affirmative," 
and aputthe sweatpants on." (R. 153:113, 124-25). Immediately thereafter, officers 
handcuffed him, took him to a classroom, and searched him. (R. 153:114-15). To 
Lineberry's surprise, Gordon found a handcuff key in the pants. (Id.) Lineberry stated, 
"I don't know how it got there. I borrowed a pair of sweats. I wasn't sure how it got 
there. I was surprised - ." (R. 153:115, 122). Also, he told Gordon he took the pants off 
the rail. (R. 153:115). Inmates Kurtis Hansen and James Brannan provided 
corroborating evidence. They testified that Lineberry did not own sweatpants. (R. 
153:100, 107). He "borrowed clothes all the time." (R. 153:100, 107). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Lineberry guilty of possessing 
contraband: the handcuff key. (R. 153:152-53). At sentencing, defense counsel 
requested a reduction in the conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. (R. 154:4-6). 
The trial court denied that request. (R. 154:8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 allows a trial court to enter "a judgment of conviction 
for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly" if- having regard 
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for the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the 
defendant - the court concludes that the existing sentence would be unduly harsh. A trial 
court's denial of a motion for a section 402 reduction is reviewed for an abuse of discre-
tion. In this case, Lineberry maintains the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his 
request for a section 402 reduction. The evidence shows that while Lineberry may have 
been reckless in borrowing someone else's sweatpants, he had no knowledge of the key 
hidden in the drawstring of the waistband. In addition, pursuant to prison policy, officials 
disciplined Lineberry for the handcuff key. Moreover, Lineberry was already serving a 
sentence for life in prison when the incident in this case occurred. Even without the 
additional conviction here, the Board of Pardons and Parole would have the discretion 
and authority to retain Lineberry as long as it deemed necessary. The nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant supported a 
402 reduction. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the reduction. 
ARGUMENT 
LINEBERRY ASSERTS THAT THE SENTENCE AND CONVICTION 
SHOULD BE VACATED FOR A SECTION 402 REDUCTION. 
This Court reviews sentencing issues for an abuse of discretion. See_ State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion results when 
the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant [sentencing] factors,"5 State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 119?.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)) (footnote omitted), or when the trial court fails to give "'adequate weight to 
certain mitigating circumstances.'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, |^ 15, 40 P.3d 626 
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(quoting State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). Sentencing requires discretion 
because it "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court.55 State v. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Section 76-3-402 states in part the following: 
If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the 
history and character of the defendant, and after having given any victims present 
at the sentencing and the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, 
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that 
degree of offense established by statute, the court maiy enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1); se^id_§ 76-3-402(3), (6) (concerning reduction); State v. 
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 30, 127 P.3d 682 (stating that Section 76-3-402 "allows a 
sentencing judge, after reviewing 'the nature and circumstances of the offense' and 'the 
history and character of the defendant,' to reduce the degree of the charged offense to the 
'next lower degree of offense' when the penalty associated with the charged offense 
would be'unduly harsh'"). 
In State v. Boyd, the defendant entered a guilty plea On a misdemeanor offense and 
went to trial on a rape charge. 2001 UT 30, ]f 1, 25 P.3d 985. The jury convicted him. 
Id. At sentencing, the defendant requested a reduced conviction under Section 76-3-402. 
See id. at Tf 30. The trial court denied the request and defendant raised the issue on 
appeal. IcL at \ 11. He argued the trial court abused its discretion, and he pointed out that 
"he and the victim were drinking, there was no substantial evidence of violence, the 
evidence at trial was contradictory, and he had no criminal record." IcL at ^ 32. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the argument and affirmed. Id_ 
5 
It ruled that the "trial court was, of course, aware" of the points addressed by the 
defendant on appeal. IdL Specifically, the trial court "had before it (1) the fact that 
[defendant] never even alleged that drinking affected his behavior, (2) the physical 
evidence [which was] consistent with the rape, (3) evidence of [the victim's] emotional 
reaction to the rape, and (4) the testimony of [the victim's] mother who chronicled the 
continuing and serious emotional problems her daughter suffered in the wake of the 
rape." M; see also State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 659-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-trial motion for a reduction 
because "sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could have reached its 
verdict"), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, Lineberry maintains the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting 
his request for a 402 reduction on the possession conviction. The nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant supported the 
reduction for the following reasons. First, the second degree felony offense was estab-
lished with evidence that Lineberry was reckless in possessing the contraband. See_ Utah 
Code Ann. $ 76-8-311.3(4)(c) (Supp. 2006); State v. Delmdo, 2001 UT App 369, 2001 
WL 1553135 (unpublished; attached as Addendum C) (ruling that recklessness would 
suffice for a charge of possessing contraband in a correctional facility); (R. 106-07; 111 
(advising jury of recklessness for the offense)). Indeed, based on the evidence here, 
Lineberry did not intentionally possess the key, he did not have actual knowledge of it, he 
had no criminal purpose, and his actions in possessing the key were not premeditated or 
planned. {See R. 153:112-25 (Lineberry's testimony)). Since Lineberry's conduct was 
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not intentional, knowing, premeditated or malicious, "it would be unduly harsh to record 
the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402(1). The trial court should have entered a judgment of conviction "for 
the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly." IcL 
Second, the State's evidence raises suspicions about how the key came to be in 
sweatpants in Lineberry's possession. Specifically, Glenn Hunter, Lineberry's cellmate, 
tipped officers off to the handcuff key in the waistband of the pants (R. 153:16-18), and 
in exchange, at Hunter's request and as a benefit, he was transferred to a "less restrictive 
unit." (R. 153:35). Those circumstances support that the incident was orchestrated by 
Hunter to curry favor with officers. See, e.g.. State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that "statements made in an obvious attempt to curry favor 
with the authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack trust-
worthiness") (footnote and citations omitted). In addition, although Lineberry was in 
physical possession of the key, he was an unwitting participant. (See R. 153:113-15 
(Lineberry's testimony)). 
Third, under the facts and circumstances of the case, no one was injured, no one 
was harmed; there were no victims to the offense. (R. 153:16-130 (trial evidence)); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-37-2(3) & 77-38-2(9)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2007) (defining a victim as a 
[natural] person against whom a crime has been committed). 
Fourth, prior to trial, the State offered to resolve the case with Lineberry with a 
plea on a class A misdemeanor offense. (See R. 154:5). Lineberry refused the State's 
offer because he maintained his innocence. (Id.) The trial judge considered that to be 
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appropriate. (See R. 154:6 (advising Lineberry, "[Y]ou're certainly entitled to your trial, 
and that's a decision you got to make, whether to accept the offer or whether to go to 
trial. You're entitled to constitutionally make those decisions")). The judge also advised 
Lineberry that based on the decision to go to trial, "you run the risk of being sentenced at 
that level as well." (R. 154:6). While that is correct, a reduction from a second degree 
felony offense to a third degree felony would still hold Lineberry to the risk of trial and a 
felony conviction, and it would diminish an otherwise unduly harsh conviction. 
Fifth, after officers discovered the key in Lineberry's clothing, Lineberry was 
disciplined at the prison. (R. 153:25, 36 (recognizing that Lineberry was immediately 
moved to Uintah 1, a more restrictive unit); 154:4 (referencing prison disciplinary 
measures and maximum security)). Under those circumstances, Lineberry has already 
been punished for the possession offense. In addition, although the court did not request 
a presentence investigation report for sentencing, the record supports that when the 
incident here occurred, Lineberry was serving a life sentence. (R. 154:5). Thus, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole already had the authority and discretion - even without the 
imposition of the felony conviction in this case - to retain Lineberry for life or for as long 
as the Board deemed necessary. The conviction for the second degree felony offense 
added nothing from the perspective of the Board's discretion. Yet a reduction to a third 
degree felony offense would have given Lineberry an incentive to complete treatment and 
programs and to rehabilitate in prison. 
Finally, the prosecutor here argued against defendant's requested sentencing in 
part because the State had "information" that Lineberry "was trying to get this key to 
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Troy [Kell] on death row. Whether that be true or not, obviously having a handcuff key 
is very serious." (R. 154:7-8). To the extent the trial court relied on that representation 
in denying Lineberry's request for a reduction in sentencing, that was improper under the 
plain-error doctrine. (See R. 154 (reflecting no objection from defense counsel in 
response to the prosecutor's reference to Troy Kell)); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f^ 
57, 992 P.2d 951 (articulating plain-error standard); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 
(Utah 1989). 
Under Utah's plain-error doctrine, a defendant must show error that should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and he must show that but for the error, there would be a 
"reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, K 57 (citation omitted); see also Verde, 770 P.2d at 121-22. 
Error is evident based on the law and a review of the record. Specifically, under 
the law, "fundamental fairness requires that procedures both in the guilt phase and in the 
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding be designed to insure that the decision-making 
process is based on accurate information." State v. Lipslzy, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 
1980); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) ("Procedural fairness is as 
obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt phase"). In that regard, a 
sentencing judge is required to act on "reasonably reliable and relevant information" in 
fixing a sentence. See_ State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). A judge may not 
rely on unconstitutionally obtained information, misinformation, unsupported 
information, or unreliable information. See ijL at 118 n.2 (identifying four instances 
when sentencing may be vacated). 
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In this case, the prosecutor's claim that Lineberry "was trying to get this key to 
Troy [Kell] on death row" was unsupported. (See R. 154:7-8 (acknowledging that the 
prosecutor did not know if the "information" was "true or not")); Lip sky, 608 P.2d at 
1248 (requiring sentencing to be "based on accurate information"). Thus, the 
prosecutor's representation violated fundamental fairness. See Lips Icy, 608 P.2d at 1248. 
In the event the trial court relied on the prosecutor's unsupported claims to reject the 402 
reduction, that was error. The first prong of the plain-error doctrine is established. 
Next, under the "obviousness" prong of the plain-error doctrine, this Court will 
assess whether "given the circumstances, the trial court should have been aware that an 
error was being committed at the time." Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 n.l 1 (citations omitted). 
Under the circumstances here, the trial court should have been aware of the error. 
Indeed, the trial judge sat through the trial. (R. 153). Thus, the judge would have known 
that nothing supported the prosecutor's claim that Lineberry was trying to get the key to 
Kell. (See, e.g., R. 153:16-130 (no reference to Troy Kell)). Likewise, the prosecutor 
presented nothing at sentencing to support his suspicions about the handcuff key and 
Kell. (R. 154); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (2008) (giving the prosecuting attorney 
the "opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence") 
(emphasis added). That is obvious; the second prong of the plain-error doctrine is met. 
Under the third prong of the plain-error analysis, to the extent the trial court relied 
on the prosecutor's specious claim as a basis for rejecting the requested reduction in 
sentencing, that was prejudicial to Lineberry. To explain, Troy Kell was convicted of 
capital homicide for stabbing a fellow inmate to death at the prison in Gunnison, Utah. 
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See State v. Kell 2002 UT 106, fflf 2-6, 61 P.3d 1019. According to reports of Kell's 
offense, he and the victim were removed from their units for transfer to the prison's 
medical facility. 7^ /. at \ 4. Kell and the victim were both placed in "double locked 
handcuffs fastened to a belt around the waist. Their feet were not placed in shackles so 
that they could safely descend the stairs from the top tier of the cell block." IcL "While 
descending to the lower tier, defendant [Kell] removed his handcuffs with a partial 
handcuff key that had been altered with a homemade handle made from melted plastic 
utensils." M at f^ 5. He then produced a shank that he used to "stab [the victim] 
repeatedly in the neck, eyes, face, back and chest. Defendant was free to use his 
unrestrained hands" because he had unshackled himself with a handcuff key. IcL 
The prosecutor's reference here to Kell - an inmate who freed himself with a 
handcuff key to kill another inmate - was used to inflame the court against Lineberry and 
to implicate Lineberry in Kell's premeditated, intentional acts. The reference was highly 
prejudicial and improper. It was intended to appeal to the trial court's sense of horror and 
to provoke the court to aggressively punish. In addition, the prosecutor's improper and 
unfounded reference to Troy Kell likely caused the trial court to disregard Lineberry's 
defense in the case and to discount evidence supporting that Lineberry was an unwitting 
participant. (See R. 153:112-25 (Lineberry's testimony)). The prosecutor's reference to 
Troy Kell was prejudicial. Absent the reference, the trial court likely would have given 
more deference to Lineberry in his request for a reduction in sentencing, since the facts of 
this case supported that Lineberry's conduct was reckless. (See R. 153: 112-25 
(Lineberry's testimony)). On that basis, the third prong of the plain-error doctrine is met. 
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Where the trial court rejected Lineberry's request for the 402 reduction, the 
conviction for the second degree felony offense was unduly harsh. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Lineberry respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand the matter for a 402 reduction. 
SUBMITTED this $ ^ day of dCipher , 2008. 
Linda M. Jones / 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this _9j^ day of OcAo\)cr , 2008. 
v : Linda M. Jones 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of , 2008. 
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Tab A 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GREGORY D LINEBERRY, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071400456 FS 
Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN 
Date: May 15, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vickielc 
Prosecutor: CHRISTIAN JR, K ADAM 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VALDEZ, JAMES A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 6, 1982 
Audio 
Tape Number: 0 8 063 Tape Count: 1.52/ 
CHARGES 
1. ITEMS PROH IN CORRECTIONAL/HEALTH FAC - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/24/2008 Guilty 
Defendant waives the reading of the Information. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
HEARING 
Mr, Valdez motion to Court to sentence the defendant to a F3, 
76-3-402 . 
Mr. Christian objects to this motion. 
The Court denies the motion. 
Mr. Valden informs the Court he will appeal this case, and request 
to withdraw as counsel on this case. 
The Court grants this motion. 
Page 1 000121 
Case No: 071400456 
Date: May 15, 2008 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ITEMS PROH IN 
CORRECTIONAL/HEALTH FAC a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Consecutively to time now serving at the Utah State Prison. The 
defendant elects to serve his time at the Utah State Prison. The 
defendant has been sentenced without a pre-sentence report. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1025.00 
$0.00 
$484 .46 
$1025.00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$1025.00 
$0 
$484.46 
$1025.00 
Plus Interest 
Page 2 oooi2i 
Case No: 071400456 
Date: May 15, 2008 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
The Court request the Board of Pardons monitor the repayment of all 
fines and attorney fees due. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $400.00 Plus Interest 
Pay m behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
Dated this Y^ .- day of j\!\( 
ROYAL I HANSEN 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 000123 
TabB 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 2008) 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense—Procedure and limitations 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances 
of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of 
the defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the 
prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court 
may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on 
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, 
the court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney; 
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide notice 
to an) victims; 
(d) after a hearing if requested b) cither part}' under Subsection (2)(c): and 
(c) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense is in the interest of justice. 
(3)(a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the 
reduction is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically agrees 
in writing or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two degrees. 
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section docs not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an 
expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if: 
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or 
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which 
the reduction is sought. 
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the 
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered. 
(7)(a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires 
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under Section 
77-27-21.5 have expired. 
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under 
Subsection 77-27-21.5(10)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for the 
offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender. 
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding 
which: 
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would 
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence; and 
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-402; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 7, § 1; Laws 2006, 
c. 50, § l,eff. May 1,2006; Laws 2006, c. 189, § 6, eff. July L 2006; Laws 2007, c. 
103, § Leff April 30. 2007. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
BENCH, Judge. 
*1 Defendant argues that the trial court 
erred when it instructed the jury on the 
culpable mens rea for the offense of 
transportation or possession of items 
prohibited in a correctional facility, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
311.3(4)(c) (1999). The trial court 
instructed the jury that it must find that 
Defendant committed the offense 
"intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." 
Defendant argues that the instruction 
should not have included recklessness as 
a culpable mental state. 
Section 76-8-311.3(4)(c) provides: "Any 
offender who possesses at a correctional 
facility ... any firearm, ammunition, 
dangerous weapon, or implement of 
escape is guilty of a second degree 
felony."Id. Because subsection (4)(c) 
does not identify a culpable mental state, 
Defendant contends that we should look 
to other subsections within section 76-8-
311.3. See, e.g.,Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
311.3(2)(d), (4)(d), (4)(e), and (5)(d). 
These other subsections identify the 
culpable mental state for similar crimes 
committed by "any persons-including 
inmates-as either knowing or intentional. 
Id. Defendant argues that we should read 
this same language into subsection 
(4)(c), which deals only with persons 
already *;in custody at a correctional 
facility/Vaf. § 76-8-311.3(1X0. 
Defendant's approach, however, is 
contrary to longstanding rules of 
statutory construction. When interpreting 
a statute, we ^ "first examine the statute's 
plain language/ " State v. Chaney, 1999 
UT App 309, & 22, 989 P.2d 1091 
(citation omitted). We also " 'presume 
that the Legislature used each term 
advisedly/ w" Id. (citation omitted). Had 
the Legislature intended the mens rea for 
subsection (4)(c) to be intentional or 
knowing, it could have easily included 
that specific language as it did in other 
subsections. See, e.g.,Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-311,3(2)(d), (4)(d), (4)(e), and 
(5)(d). For us to read such language into 
subsection (4)(c) would be contrary to 
the plain meaning of the statutes. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-102 (1999) 
instructs that "when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility."/^. Section 76-8-
311.3(4)(e) does not "indicate[ ] a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibility ... without requiring proof 
of any culpable mental state."M § 76-2-
102. Therefore we conclude that the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury 
that the culpable mental state for this 
crime was either knowing, intentional, or 
reckless. 
Accordingly, Defendant's conviction is 
affirmed. 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding 
Judge, and NORMAN 11. JACKSOR 
Associate Presiding Judge, concur. 
UtahApp.?2001. 
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